Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. This is not a function of any other art.
The case is similar with the idea as well: even if there is some one good thing that is predicated [of things] in common, or there is some separate thing, itself by itself, it is clear that it would not be subject to action or capable of being possessed by a human being.
The proud man, then, is an extreme in respect of the greatness of his claims, but a mean in respect of the rightness of them; for he claims what is accordance with his merits, while the others go to excess or fall short.
Virtue, then, is twofold, intellectual and moral. Both the coming-into-[1103a] being and increase of intellectual virtue result mostly from teaching—hence it requires experience and time—whereas moral virtue is the result of habit, and so it is that moral virtue got its name [ēthikē] by a slight alteration of the term habit [ethos].
As far as the name goes, we may almist say that the great majority of mankind are agreed about this; for both the multitude and the persons of refinement speak of it as happiness, and conceive 'the good life' or 'doing well' to be the same thing as 'being happy.